A Philosophical Mode of Life:

Pierre Hadot’s What is Ancient Philosophy?

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Abstract: This article presents Pierre Hadot’s treatment of a philosophical mode of life as it originated in ancient philosophy and fared down through the centuries. Hadot contends that philosophical discourse begins with a choice of life—an existential option from which philosophical discourse arises. The concept of philosophy as a purely theoretical attitude developed after the ancient period and reflects the domestication of philosophy within the context of the medieval and modern universities. The ancient schools of philosophy were concerned with a way of life that demanded the conversion of one’s being, a change of lifestyle, and a specific view of the world. Philosophical discourse, on this view, was designed to reveal, justify, and represent the existential option to the world.

Pierre Hadot has contributed two exceptional works on philosophical practice, the second of which is an overview of ancient philosophy.1 Hadot’s main concern in his second book is to focus, not on “philosophies,” but rather on “philosophical modes of life.”2 In his own words, “The present work attempts to describe, in its common features, the historical and spiritual phenomenon represented by ancient philosophy.” What makes this focus even more interesting is Hadot’s contention that “philosophical discourse…originates in a choice of life and an existential option—not vice versa.”3 It is this existential choice, not the philosophical discourse that arises from it, that takes center stage. This is very different from the conception of philosophy that developed, according to Hadot, after the ancient period, “as a purely theoretical attitude.”4 It is this notion of “philosophy as a way of life” that explains the original relevance of philosophy to its founders in the West and to wisdom seekers in our own day.5

A second point the author makes is that the choice and decision concerning this way of life is not made as a solitary choice:

There can never be a philosophy or philosophers outside a group or community—in a word, a philosophical “school.” The philosophical school thus corresponds, above all, to the choice of a certain way of life and existential option which demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a conversion of one’s entire being, and ultimately a certain desire to be and to live a certain way. This existential option, in turn, implies a certain vision of the world, and the task of philosophical discourse will therefore be to
reveal and rationally justify this existential option, as well as this representation of the world.⁶

If, as Hadot contends, philosophy has been understood as a mere “theoretical attitude” since the ancient philosophers passed off the scene, then their original vision of philosophy as a way of life deserves attention as a way to revive philosophy and philosophical interest. Philosophy needs to be rescued from philosophy professors and restored as “the application of a certain ideal of life.”⁷

How, then, is philosophy as a way of life related to philosophy as discourse? Hadot answers by saying that philosophy is “a discourse and a way of life which tend toward wisdom without ever achieving it.”⁸ His point is not to set up an opposition between theory and practice; rather, “philosophical discourse is a part of this way of life.”⁹ Also included in the philosopher’s way of life are “spiritual exercises,” which “could be physical, as in dietary regimes, or discursive, as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation.”¹⁰ This is a vision of philosophy that certainly appeals to the existential philosopher or to any thinker who would like to see philosophy restored to the practical realm of everyday life.

**Philosophy before Philosophy**¹¹

From the beginning, Hadot attempts to get to the heart of philosophy by tracing its point of departure from the previous mythical approach. What makes Hadot’s treatment here so helpful is the exceptional clarity of his analysis. In this respect, I have found his explanation superior to all others I have read. He begins by reminding us that “the words belonging to the *philosophia* family did not in fact appear until the fifth century B.C., and the term *philosophia* itself was not defined until the fourth century B.C., by Plato.”¹² While most standard treatments point out, as Hadot does, that the Greeks introduced rational explanations of the world as opposed to mythical explanations, Hadot specifies precisely how this “milestone in the history of thought” differed from the previous mythical worldview. Specifically, the first Greek thinkers proposed a theory that “sought to account for the world by positing not a battle among personified elements but a battle among ‘physical’ realities and the predominance of one of these over the others. This radical transformation is summed up in the Greek word *phusis.*”¹³

In Plato, the concept of *phusis* as “natural process” is combined with the concept of the soul: “Yet, for Plato, what is primordial and originary is movement, the process which engenders itself and is self-moving—that is to say, the soul. Thus, a creationist schema is substituted for the evolutionist schema. The soul, as the first principle, prior to everything else, is thus identified with *phusis.*”¹⁴

At the heart of these beginnings is the explanation of both materialism and idealism in the Western tradition. Where *phusis* is understood without the personalistic connotations of Plato’s conception of the soul, one’s rational explanation of the cosmos will tend toward naturalism; with the personalistic connotations, that explanation will tend toward a kind of panentheism. God will be understood as imminent, not transcendent, as a rational principle operative in the world, not as fully personal. Hence, the pantheism of the West (more accurately understood as panentheism) finds its origin in this first movement of philosophy among the Greeks.
Hadot mentions another “fundamental demand of the Greek mentality: a desire to form and to educate, or the concern for what the Greeks called paideia.” Those who possess arete (excellence, virtue) pass it on to the young: “This [arete] was the excellence required by the nobility of blood, which later on…would become virtue.” The Sophists played an important role here; they “invented education in an artificial environment—a system that was to remain one of the characteristics of our civilization.” The Sophists developed the idea of arete as “competence intended to enable young people to play a role in the city,” a form of excellence that can be developed through apprenticeship.

Rather than establishing schools, the Sophists offered courses for pay, functioning as itinerant professors. This enduring educational legacy contrasts notably with the Socratic philosophical ideal, which focuses on arete as virtue, a form of self-development that relies more on the laboratory of life than the artificial environment of the classroom or apprenticeship.

Interestingly, most of us actively pursuing a philosophical calling find ourselves torn between the Sophistic and Socratic approaches to philosophy; we are both “itinerant professors” and personal practitioners of philosophy as a way of life. My own approach to this tension is to define myself as a philosopher in the Socratic sense who embraces the Sophistic approach as a legitimate—but partial—outlet for the calling (a philosophical occupation). As long as the Socratic ideal is not overshadowed or replaced by the sophistic occupation, the tension may prove healthy and even creative.

**The Idea of Doing Philosophy**

Hadot says, “it is perhaps in Heroditus’ work that we find the first mention of ‘philosophical’ activity.” Interestingly, the idea of “doing” philosophy is not a modern idea at all; it goes back to the beginnings of philosophy. Doing philosophy arises from “the disposition of a person who found his interest, pleasure, or raison de vivre in devoting himself to a particular activity….Philosophia, therefore, would be the interest one took in wisdom.”

Hadot also says, “philosophical activity included everything relating to intellectual and general culture.” This raises the question: “Was the person who is sophos one who knew and had seen many things, had traveled a great deal, and was broadly cultured, or was he rather the person who knew how to conduct himself in life and who lived in happiness?” The answer, “in the last analysis” is both: “real knowledge is know-how, and the true know-how is knowing how to do good.” In summary, “philosophical activity included everything relating to intellectual and general culture.”

I find in this ancient conception the ideal of the generalist. This ideal also explains “the psychagogic value of discourse and the capital importance of the mastery of the word.” Hadot shows how “the richness and variety of this idea of sophia” is reflected in the poet, the politician, and the artisan—all are philosophers in their respective areas, showing skill (excellence) in their doing. This rich idea of sophia also anticipates those exercises that become the heart of philosophical practice: “In such incantations [discourse and the mastery of the word], we can
discern a sketch of what would later become philosophical spiritual exercises, whether at the level of discourse or that of contemplation.”

The idea of philosophical discourse as a kind of “incantation” jumped off the page as I first read these words. I have long recognized the spiritual centrality of “the mastery of the word” as this is emphasized in the Hebrew-Christian scriptures. But the idea of the word as an incantation stresses the power of words—their magical effect—as well as their ritual significance. The spirituality of words is as much a part of the early philosophical vision as it is of the Christian vision of life. For the philosopher especially, words are sacramental, feeding and nourishing the soul in a way they do not for others. It is this sacramental and incantational quality of words that informs the love of wisdom in all its forms.

The Figure of Socrates

According to Hadot, “it was under the influence of the personality and teaching of Socrates that Plato, in the Symposium, gave new meaning to the world ‘philosopher,’ and therefore also to the word ‘philosophy.’” By idealizing Socrates in this dialogue, Plato defines both the philosopher and philosophy through an instrumental case. What this approach shows is that “knowledge is not just plain knowing, but knowing-what-ought-to-be-preferred, and hence how to live.” This is the knowledge of value taken from Socrates’ inner experience. Specifically, “the content of Socratic knowledge is thus essentially ‘the absolute value of moral content,’ and the certainty provided by the choice of this value.” This is knowledge as “love of the good.” In classic Kantian style, Socrates shows that “there is only one evil thing: moral fault. And there is only one good and one value: The will to do good.”

Socrates’ moral center makes his connection with the idea of philosophical practice clear: “The purity of moral intent must be constantly renewed and reestablished.” Therefore, “[s]elf-transformation is never definitive, but demands perpetual reconquest.” In other words, philosophy is neither inside nor outside of the world (Merleau-Ponty). In what is perhaps the most practical description of philosophy I have ever read, Hadot says that Socrates might be “the prototype for that image of the philosopher…who flees the difficulties of life in order to take refuge within his good conscience.”

What Hadot brings out of Plato’s description of Socrates is the secret that generally escapes the inexperienced reader of Plato’s dialogues. What frustrates the novice in reading the dialogues is that they often end without an answer to the main question being addressed. What Hadot shows is that this is their very point: “Such an image shows that knowledge is found within the soul itself and it is up to the individual to discover it, once he has discovered, thanks to Socrates, that his own knowledge was empty.” The reader of Plato, like Socrates interlocutors, is supposed to discover “the vanity of his knowledge” so “that he will at the same time discover his truth…by passing from knowledge to himself.” This is what makes the Socratic philosopher a “gadfly.” In the simplest sense, philosophy should lead to a kind of self-doubt where we “question ourselves and the values that guide our own lives.” Hadot wisely recognizes that “this is the Individual dear to Kierkegaard—the individual as unique and unclassifiable personality.”
And yet, the Socratic example is not one of pure individualism: “Care for the self is not opposed to care for the city.” Rather, “care for the self is thus, indissolubly, care for the city and care for others.” As is often the case in this fine book, Hadot gives a profound summary: “He transcends both people and things by his moral demands and the engagement they require; yet he is involved with people and with things because the only true philosophy lies in the everyday.” This is the essence of philosophical practice, which I have tried to preserve as the touchstone of my own thinking about philosophy. As Plutarch said of Socrates, I also want to affirm that “at all times and in every place, in everything that happens to us, daily life gives us the opportunity to do philosophy.”

The “Philosopher” in Plato’s Symposium

Hadot’s discussion of the Symposium is truly one of the most profound and interesting discussions I have encountered. He points out that Plato’s Symposium “is intended to portray Socrates and to idealize him.” Plato does this in the following way: “Throughout the dialogue…we notice that the features of the figure of Eros tend to become confused with those of the figure of Socrates.” In other words, “Eros and Socrates personify—one mythically, the other historically—the figure of the philosopher.”

The myth of the birth of Eros is used to explain love as “a diamond—a being that is intermediary between gods and men, immortals and mortals.” Eros was born on Aphrodite’s birthday through the union of Penia (poverty) and Poros (wealth): Born on Aphrodite’s birthday, he is enamored of beauty; but since he is the son of Penia, he is always poor, indigent, and a beggar. At the same time, since he is the son of Poros, he is clever and inventive.

Hadot goes on to make the connection with Socrates and the philosopher explicit. Like Socrates, Diotima says that “needy Eros…is always poor, for he is far from being delicate or beautiful, as people think. On the contrary, he is rough, dirty, barefoot, and homeless.” However, Socrates is also described by Aristophanes (The Clouds) as “a worthy son of Poros: “Hardy, a smooth talker, brazen, impudent, never at a loss for words—a real fox.” Hadot summarizes this portrait as follows: “This portrait of Eros-Socrates is at the same time the portrait of the philosopher, insofar as Eros, the Son of Poros and Penia, is poor and deficient. Yet he knows how to compensate for his poverty, privation, and deficiency by means of his cleverness. For Diotima, Eros is therefore a philosopher, since he is halfway between sophia and ignorance.”

While this description is based on mythology, it embodies an obvious psychological insight: “He who is not aware of lacking something does not desire what he does not think he needs.” Therefore, the philosopher is an intermediary between the transcendent wisdom of the gods and the ignorance of those who do neither know nor know that they do not know. In answer to Socrates’ question concerning who does philosophy, Diotima responds: “It is those in the middle, halfway between the two; and Love is one of them. For wisdom is, no doubt, one of the most beautiful things; but love is love of the beautiful. Love must therefore be a philosopher [lover of wisdom], and, as a philosopher he must be midway between the wise and the senseless.”
This idea of the philosopher as intermediary has implications for the philosopher’s self-image. As an intermediary, he is neither a sage nor a nonsage. He does not possess wisdom but loves and desires it: “According to the Symposium, then, philosophy is not wisdom, but a way of life and discourse determined by the idea of wisdom.” 42 In other words, the philosopher pursues wisdom but does not possess it. Logically this is possible because, in Plato’s school, a contradictory opposition, such as good and bad, allows for an intermediary position that is neither good nor bad. Thus, “what is intermediate—the ‘neither good nor bad’ and the ‘philosopher’—do display the degrees of more and less.” Taken personally, this means that I do not view myself as simply wise or ignorant; rather, I am pursuing wisdom out of a love for it and because of an awareness of ignorance to be overcome.

Hadot illustrates this philosophical self-image by using Kierkegaard as an example: “Like Kierkegaard, the Christian who wanted to be a Christian but knew that only Christ is a Christian, the philosopher knows that he cannot reach his model. The true philosopher will always be the person who knows that he does not know, who knows that he is not a sage, and who is therefore neither sage nor nonsage. He is unclassifiable, and, like Eros and Socrates, he has neither hearth nor home.” 43

This idea of the philosopher as suspended between heaven and earth is parallel to the Christian idea that mankind is a “mixture of divinity and humanity.” 44 Bearing the image of both the first and Second Adam (Christ), he experiences “a strangeness, and almost to a lack of balance, an inner dissonance.” Like the philosopher, we can “make progress, but always within the limits of lack-of-wisdom.” The Christian philosopher, therefore, must also be content to think in terms of “more or less” and not in terms of the “absolute perfection” of the sage. 45

On deeper reflection, this is a tremendously liberating self-image. What it means is that I am not really good or bad; rather, I am more or less good and bad. Therefore, I am not supposed to view myself as a finished product, good or bad. Instead, I should put myself in question: Am I pursuing the good right now or the bad? I am—on a moment-by-moment reckoning—what I am choosing to be right now. Am I choosing love and goodness, or am I pursuing evil desires, and what is my true desire in the first place? By keeping my true desire and motivation in mind—not my fixed nature as good or bad—I can aspire to something beyond me that defines and empowers me. I can think of no better way to avoid both inferiority and pride than this view of the self.

Hadot’s discussion provides insight into the moral ambivalence of human nature: Am I good or evil by nature? Up to now, I have not been able to embrace the idea that I am good by nature, but neither have I been able to embrace a kind of Buddhist no-self view, which has often tempted me. The answer is provided by Hadot (and by Kierkegaard): We are good by desire and by choice; we are empty vessels alone (no-self), but we were constituted to be filled by a goodness outside ourselves and to which we aspire. We are in process, not yet a product. We are impoverished—lacking by nature—but we are also wealthy in the true wisdom. Philosophical practice starts here with the proper self-image. We are empty-being-filled, and making peace with that is the first step to becoming a philosopher like Socrates.
Plato and the Academy

Hadot’s discussion of Plato’s Academy develops a fundamental idea in ancient philosophy: “Philosophy could be carried out only by means of a community of life and dialogue between masters and disciples, within the framework of a school.” In the words of Seneca, “[t]he living word and life in common will benefit you more than written discourse.” In essence, Plato “institutionalized” the “Socratic conception of education by living contact and by love.”

Scholars have recognized that the Academy was a community of statesmen in training and “training in dialectics was absolutely necessary, insofar as Plato’s disciples were destined to play a role in their city.” Plato’s notion of dialectics, however, bears little resemblance to the average logic course today. Dialectics is really the use of logic in dialogue, a dialogue that leads to a self-transformation (askesis): “A true dialogue is possible only if the interlocutors want to dialogue….neither one of the interlocutors imposes his truth on the other. On the contrary, dialogue teaches them to put themselves in each other’s place and thereby transcend their own point of view.”

The goal of the dialogue, then, is that each participant is transformed by submitting “to the superior authority of the logos.” For Plato, thinking itself is a dialogue: “Thought and discourse are the same thing except that it is the soul’s silent, inner dialogue with itself that was called thought.”

This idea is really at the heart of my own learning method. Through journaling, I attempt to transform a written discourse into a dialogue between an author and myself. Plato would say that a book—like his own dialogues—can really only provide an example of philosophical discourse, not ready-made answers to the questions addressed in the book. He would also say that the lack of live (oral) interaction with the author either short-circuits or limits the process, since I may respond to the author, but the author cannot respond to me. Despite these limitations, I have employed the dialogical model of learning as my primary learning style. By incorporating the discipline of meditation in my learning style, I come as close as possible to the Platonic ideal for learning. Through “inner discourses” and “meditation” the rational soul is awakened.

The two-fold idea of philosophy as a way of life and a philosophical discourse also illuminates the seeming inadequacies of Plato’s dialogues. Hadot himself says, “We might wonder why Plato wrote dialogues, for, in his view, spoken philosophical discourse is far superior to that which is written.” Indeed, “there is no real knowledge outside the living dialogue.” Hadot says that the modern reader’s search for Plato’s “system” within the dialogues is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of their purpose. Interestingly, the dialogues are really more like propaganda or advertising for philosophy than philosophy itself. They provide the reader with the opportunity to witness the philosopher’s way of life and discourse; they “form” more than they “inform.” As one reads the dialogues, it becomes clear that the Forms are “moral values, which serve as the foundation of our judgments on things concerning human life.” From this, one learns that “Platonic knowledge is, above all, a knowledge of values.” Therefore, understanding that knowledge is grounded in the beautiful, the just, and the good does not make one a partaker of those virtues. Reading the dialogues, then, is sitting on the sidelines watching what real
philosophers do and how they live. Until one chooses the life and discipline of the philosopher, one cannot experience the moral transformation to a virtuous life of knowledge.

Hadot says that philosophy “becomes the lived experience of a presence. From the experience of the presence of a beloved being, we rise to the experience of a transcendent presence.”57 One need not embrace Plato’s impersonalistic logos doctrine to affirm that knowledge is personal; on a theistic basis, one must also affirm that knowledge is ultimately personal and therefore requires personal interaction and community to develop. Nor should one deny that knowledge is fundamentally virtue. This is as true on the basis of Christian doctrine as it is on the basis of Plato’s logos doctrine.

Aristotle and His School

Unlike Plato’s Academy, which trained people for political life, “Aristotle’s school…trained people only for the philosophical life.”58 For Aristotle, “philosophical happiness is found in ‘life according to the mind,’ which is situated in man’s highest excellence and virtue.” There is a kind of asceticism and detachment inherent in this view that anticipates the later Hellenistic philosophers: “A person who devotes himself to the activity of the mind depends only on himself.” Unlike the politically active life of the city, “the philosophical life…can be lived only in leisure and in detachment from material worries.”59

While Aristotle recommends the “theoretical” life, his understanding of “theoretikos” does not divorce theory from practice, as later philosophy tended to do. Rather, the theoretical “can be applied to a philosophy which is practical, lived, and active.”60 Happiness, then, is living the theoretical life, inasmuch “as the intellect is what is most essential in man, yet at the same time it is something divine.” Like Plato’s view of the philosopher, Aristotle’s view suspends the philosopher between heaven and earth but in a different way: “It is as if man’s true essence consisted in being above himself.”61

Formally speaking, Aristotle defines mankind’s essential nature as the image of God: “Aristotle hints that the model for this contemplative action is the deity and the universe, which exert no action directed toward the outside but take themselves as the object of their actions.”62 From this arises Aristotle’s idea of knowledge for its own sake and his “ethics of disinterestedness and objectivity.” Hadot shows how the fundamentally religious center of Aristotle’s view of philosophy shapes his method and goals: “For Aristotle the life of the mind consists, to a large degree, in observing, doing research, and reflecting on one’s observations. Yet this activity is carried out in a certain spirit, which we might go so far as to describe as an almost religious passion for reality in all its aspects…for we find traces of the divine in all things.”63

This sensitivity to the religious center of Aristotle’s thinking is one of the very helpful contributions of this book. Hadot has found a way to summarize a seemingly secular philosophical way of life by tracing its roots all the way down to the sacred and divine. Aristotle’s way also shows that the philosopher is not merely a scholar, although Aristotle is the prime exemplar: “Rather than referring to the life of a scholar, then, we should speak of ‘life exercising itself for wisdom,’ or the ‘philosophical’ life, since for Aristotle wisdom represents the perfection of theoria.”64 What this means is that, like Plato, Aristotle does not place ultimate
confidence in the power of discourse to inform; rather, discourse is primarily formative. Like Plato, “Aristotle expected discussion, reaction, judgment, and criticism from his listeners; teaching was still, fundamentally, a dialogue.” In the end, philosophical discourse is not sufficient to make a person wise or virtuous because “he who is inclined to obey his passions will listen in vain and without profit, since the goal is not knowledge but practice.” Philosophical formation comes only after “long familiarity with concepts and methods, and also with observed facts.”

The upshot of Hadot’s analysis of Greek philosophy is that the philosophical way of life is more like a process than a doctrine. Over the last thirty years of doing philosophy, I have focused more on the search for ideas than on the spiritual discipline of my activity. Looking in hindsight through Hadot’s eyes, however, reveals the same process of contemplation, meditation, and dialogue with other philosophers of the past and present. Moreover, I have seen in my teaching, especially within a college for professional studies, that I am now more focused on bringing students into the culture of philosophy than I am on conveying ideas—dialogue more than doctrine, formation more than information.

**The Hellenistic Schools**

In characterizing Hellenistic philosophy, Hadot establishes the continuity between Hellenistic philosophy and the early beginnings of philosophy: “Hellenistic philosophy seems to have developed naturally out of the movement which preceded it. It often revisits Presocratic themes, and above all is deeply marked by the Socratic spirit.” These connections are expressed in four common themes: (1) Philosophy as an “existential choice” and way of life; (2) Philosophy as grounded in physics; (3) Philosophy as an essentially ethical theory of knowing; and (4) Philosophy as the search for perfect peace of mind.

Hadot develops the first theme of philosophy as a way of life by showing how each of the schools exemplifies it. Skeptics and Cynics offer almost no doctrine or discourse; rather, their philosophy is almost purely a way of life: “for the Cynics…what was at stake was not speculation but a decision which engaged the whole of life. Thus, their philosophy was entirely exercise (askesis) and effort.” Similarly, “the philosophy of Pyrrho—like that of Socrates, like that of the Cynics—was thus a lived philosophy, and an exercise of transforming one’s way of life.” So prominent was this theme in Epicureanism that Epicurus himself was a role model for his disciples, who chose to obey him and his way of life. In the Hellenistic period, the philosopher was really a “director of conscience,” an ethical guide: “Like Socrates and Plato, he [Epicurus] was well aware of the therapeutic role of the word.” Philosophy as therapeutic seems like a new idea in our own time, but—in actuality—it was the ancient view. Philosophy is first and foremost “a choice and a decision.”

Hadot’s second theme is that philosophy in the Hellenistic period is grounded in physics. In fact, each philosopher’s theory of reality is as much a consequence of his choice of life as it is an expression: “Indeed, philosophical theory is here merely the expression and consequence of the original choice of life, and a means of obtaining peace of mind.” So, for example, Epicureanism posits both “chance” and “necessity” as components of its physics. This theory is really just an ethical postulate: “it is obvious that physics is elaborated as a function of the
Epicurean choice of life. People must be masters of their desires.” In short, there must be an element of chance to oppose physical determinism in order to support this commitment. Even the religious components of Epicureanism support the basic choice of life: “Epicurus’ gods are the projection and incarnation of the Epicurean ideal of life. The gods spend their lives enjoying their own perfection and the pleasure of existing, with no needs and no worries.” The gods, like the Epicurean philosopher, spend their existence seeking personal pleasure and peace of mind. The Stoic materialism reflects the same orientation: “Stoic materialism is explained by the desire to make happiness available to all, within this world, which is not opposed to any superior world.” Hadot summarizes this made-to-order physics as follows: “For the Stoics, as for the Epicureans, physics was not developed for its own sake but had an ethical finality….For the Epicurean…each being is an individuality—atomized as it were, and isolated with regard to the other….For the Stoics…everything is within everything else, bodies are organic wholes, and everything happens by rational necessity.”

Thus, the Epicurean supports freedom in his conception of physics, and the Stoic supports rationality: “These two schemes of physics were naturally contradictory yet analogous, for both schools sought to base the possibility of their existential choice upon nature itself.” This leads naturally to Hadot’s third theme.

That philosophy requires an essentially ethical theory of knowing is a radical perspective that most modern philosophers have yet to recognize. For Hellenistic philosophers, the problem was simple: “Evil is to be found not within things, but in the value judgments which people bring to bear upon things. People can therefore be cured…if they are persuaded to change their value judgments.” Once again, it is clear that “all these philosophies wanted to be therapeutic.” The practicality of this view of philosophy also made it possible to be a philosopher without being a specialist: “This was why dogmatic philosophies like Stoicism and Epicureanism had popular and missionary character: since technical and theoretical discussions were matters for specialists, they could be summed up…in a small number of formulas…which were essentially rules for practical life.” Once the rules were learned—and lived—there was no practical reason why a philosopher would need to develop his own philosophy in oral or written form: “Whoever adapted the Epicurean or Stoic way of life and put it into practice would be considered a philosopher, even if he or she did not develop a philosophical discourse, either written or oral.”

Skepticism clearly embodies this point. Here the ethical goal of philosophy trumps everything considered essential to the study of philosophy today. Professional philosophers in our time are judged primarily for their written philosophical discourses rather than their lived testimony. The notion of philosophy as a lived testimony is a radical idea having much in common with the Christian worldview. In the same way a Christian might memorize Bible verses, “the Skeptics used short, striking sayings to renew their choice of life at each moment.” The analogy between the Christian way and the Skeptic way is recognized in their common commitment to the ethical center of the philosophical life.

The fourth theme of philosophy as the search for perfect peace of mind is likely the most familiar theme of Hellenistic philosophy. Hadot states this up front: “All Hellenistic schools seem to define it [wisdom] in approximately the same terms: first and foremost, as a state of perfect peace of mind.” They, of course, differed on what brought peace of mind: “for Epicureanism, it
was the search for pleasure that motivated all human activity; whereas for Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism...the love of the good was the primordial instinct."\(^{83}\) The question raised here is simply what makes a person happy, what is the "primordial instinct." While the answers differ, the "therapeutic" goal is the same: "the philosopher must tend to the sickness of the soul, and teach mankind how to experience pleasure" (Epicurus) or rational coherence (Stoicism).\(^{84}\)

One of the profoundly practical insights at the heart of this pursuit is that what is basic to life is easy to obtain: "Thanks be to blessed Nature, who has made necessary things easy to obtain, and who has made things difficult to obtain unnecessary."\(^{85}\) The perennial appeal of Hellenistic philosophy, in my opinion, is based on this insight; peace of mind is easy to attain because only those things that disturb it are difficult to obtain.

Even in the realm of knowledge itself, the difficult may become easier. Hadot says that, "with Arcesilaus’ successors Carneades and Philo of Larissa, the Academy evolved in the direction of probabilism."\(^{86}\) By dropping the requirement of complete certainty, "it left to the individual the freedom to choose, in each concrete case, the attitude which he judged to be best according to the circumstances." In the words of Cicero: "We Academics live from day to day (that is, we make our judgments according to each particular case)...and that is why we are free." Coming full circle, what shows better the definition of philosophy "as essentially an activity of choice and decision"?

**Philosophical Schools in the Imperial Period**

One of the interesting developments of the Imperial period is that "the teaching of philosophy was taken over by the government."\(^{87}\) Hadot describes this development: "[M]unicipal philosophical education, paid for by the cities, tends to become more and more generalized in the Imperial period. This movement reached its apogee and its consecration when, in 176 A.D., the emperor, Marcus Aurelius, founded four imperial chairs of philosophy for the teaching of the four traditional doctrines (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism)." There were also a number of private professors who opened their own schools. This situation is analogous to our modern university system, except that chairs of philosophy, in that time, embraced the philosophical practice of the school they represented.

Another significant change took place that coincided with a loss of connection with the living traditions of the schools: "The situation called for a return to the sources. From this point on, instruction would consist in explaining the texts of the ‘authorities.’"\(^{88}\) In the Imperial period, "training students in the methods of thought and argumentation" gave way to more restricted discussion and a premium on "faithfulness to a tradition." The pitfall of this approach has become today’s norm: "In such a scholarly, professorial atmosphere, there was often a tendency to be satisfied with knowing the dogmas of the four great schools, without worrying about strictly personal training."\(^{89}\)

Hadot points out that philosophy in this period continued to be viewed "as an attempt at spiritual progress and a means of inner transformation."\(^{90}\) But the "radical change" was the teaching itself, which "essentially took the form of textual commentary." Interestingly, the teaching program in
this new system was often designed to correspond to “the stages of spiritual progress.” The difference was that “the reading and exegesis of texts” became the primary exercise through which that progress was achieved: “Philosophy classes consisted of oral exercises in explication of written texts.”

We see here the obvious precursor to medieval scholasticism: “From the first century B.C. on, philosophical discourse starts to change into scholastics, which would be inherited by medieval scholasticism.” This period marks “the birth of the age of the professors,” and “it was also the age of handbooks and summaries, intended either as the basis for scholarly oral exposition or else to initiate students…into the doctrines of a particular philosopher.”

The idea of philosophy as a “return to the origins of a tradition” was also combined with the idea of “revealed” truth. Traditions really embody the spiritual life of a past community of belief, and philosophy had the seeds of a religious concept of sacred tradition in its own early use of myth. Hadot gives the example of the Neoplatonists, who viewed the Chaldean Oracles “as a kind of sacred writ.” The end result was that “historical tradition was thus the norm for truth; truth and tradition, reason and authority were identified with each other.” These scholastics, like the later schoolmen of the medieval period, “attempted to reconcile all these traditions and derive from them a kind of general system of philosophy.”

One way in which this seemingly modern system remained primitive was in its commitment to community: “Community of life was one of the most important elements in education. Professors did not merely teach, but played the role of genuine directors of conscience who cared for their students’ spiritual problems.” This is, unfortunately, a far cry from the modern university professor of philosophy. What had really changed in the Imperial period was the method of contemplation, not the goal of self-transformation. Interestingly, these Imperial schools were probably more like an American Bible College than a modern university. Some schools, like the Neoplatonic, even advocated an ascetic lifestyle and mystical experience as crucial components in realizing educational goals. Philosophy still had a long way to go to arrive at the divorce of theory and practice evident in our modern university philosophy departments.

**Philosophy and Philosophical Discourse**

In distinguishing philosophy from philosophical discourse Hadot shows why philosophical exercise (*askesis*) was a necessary component of the philosophical life in ancient times. In his words, “the essential part of the philosophical life—the existential choice of a certain way of life, the experience of certain inner states and dispositions—wholly escapes expression by philosophical discourse.” Those who take discourse as sufficient, “as Seneca put it,” turn “love of wisdom (*philosophia*) into love of words (*philologia*).”

What, then, is the function of philosophical discourse? It is essentially therapeutic: “if it is the expression of the existential option of the person who utters it, discourse always has, directly or indirectly, a function which is formative, educative, psychagogic, and therapeutic.” From this perspective, it is very easy to see that the modern counseling movement, especially that segment employing cognitive and humanistic therapies, is much closer to the original spirit of ancient
philosophy than is much of university philosophy. The use of words to heal the soul and to facilitate change is really the essence of today’s counseling and self-help movements.99

Another connection with ancient philosophy is evident in the religious use of words for purposes of spiritual formation. Hadot notes an analogy between the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius and a Christian catechism: “There was an analogy here with Christianity, where discussions are reserved for theologians while the catechism suffices for average parishioners. Such philosophies could become ‘popular’ and ‘missionary.’”100 What the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius and a Christian catechism have in common is the spiritually formative use of words and sayings: “What counted was the act of writing and of talking to oneself.” The irony, once again, is that the ancient philosophical spirit is better preserved within the educational program of a local church than a modern university. Like the ancient Sophists, Christian counselors make use of “a therapeutics” useful for “healing grief and pain by means of the word.”101

The majority of Hadot’s discussion is devoted to a description of the philosophical exercises that were employed in therapeutic ways. Rather than describe those in detail, it will be more helpful to use Hadot’s own summary:

Almost all the schools advocated the practice of askesis (a Greek word meaning ‘exercise’) and self-mastery. There was Platonic askesis, which consisted in renouncing the pleasures of the flesh and in adopting a specific dietary regime, which, under the influence of Neopythagoreanism, sometimes went as far as vegetarianism. This askesis was intended to weaken the body by means of fasting and sleeplessness, so that the individual could better live the life of the spirit. Then there was Cynic askesis (also practiced by certain Stoics), which advocated enduring hunger, cold, and insults, as well as eliminating all luxury, comfort, and artifices of civilization, in order to cultivate independence and stamina. There was Pyrrhonian askesis, which trained the individual to view all things as indifferent, since we cannot tell if they are good or bad. There was that of the Epicureans, who limited their desires in order to accede to pure pleasure. And there was that of the Stoics who corrected their judgments of objects by recognizing that we must not become attached to indifferent things. All these schools called for a kind of self-duplication in which the ‘I’ refuses to be conflated with its desires and appetites, takes up a distance from the objects of its desires, and becomes aware of its power to become detached from them. It thus arises from a partial and particular vision to a universal perspective, be it that of nature or that of the Spirit.102

The vision of a universal perspective is really the salvation concept in ancient philosophy. The way this works is fascinating. According to the Epicurean vision, I may say I have truly lived when “I have known the atemporal nature of pleasure, and the perfection and absolute value of stable pleasure; but also because I have become aware of the atemporal nature of being.”103 We notice that “the pleasure of being” is really an atemporal possession, which—once had—can never be lost. Hadot uses Wittgenstein to illustrate this idea: “Perhaps Wittgenstein was thinking of Epicurus when he wrote: ‘Death is not an event of life. It is not experienced. If by ‘eternity’ we mean not infinite temporal duration but atemporalty, then whoever lives in the present lives eternally.’”104
Wittgenstein put his finger on the secret to the non-Christian notions of immortality in ancient philosophy. To think of being—life—without infinite temporal duration, you must idealize it; you must transform “I have lived” into an atemporal “I am,” which becomes the object of meaning and hope. Having lived must become atemporal being within the context of eternal death (since the self is destroyed in death). This view of atemporal being is the ultimate letting go: Having lived, I can let go of life itself; the “having lived” becomes an eternal identity, even in the face of eternal nothingness.

I would describe this atemporal being as a static projection—a deification by idealization. So the Epicurean and Stoic ideal appears to be a result of stripping the self down to an atemporal idealization—a static portrait of a temporary life. Could this be the reason why ancestor worship involves the use of pictures, portraits, and statuettes? Is the use of such icons really a reflection of the idealization of life rather than the glorification of life in the Christian sense? I believe it is. This is salvation by intellectual vision—a monistic replacement for eternal life in Christian theism and the glorification of humanity. Having “seen the infinity of things” is the Epicurean salvation; one “rises up to eternity” in the mind, not through an endless duration of life. In Hadot’s words, “in all the schools that practiced it, this exercise of thought and imagination consists, in the last analysis, in the philosopher’s becoming aware of his being within the All…of seizing the whole of reality in a single intuition.” This is the spiritual exercise of viewing things from above and looking at them “from the perspective of death.”

**Christianity as a Revealed Philosophy**

Hadot’s treatment of Christianity is the first in-depth analysis I have encountered that explains the transition to modern philosophy on the basis of the revelational philosophy of Christianity. Hadot finds the basis for Christian philosophy in the prologue of John’s gospel and his use of the word *Logos*: “The *Logos* had been a central concept of Greek philosophy, since it could signify “word” and “discourse” as well as “reason.” This is why, when the prologue to the Gospel of John identified Jesus with the Eternal *Logos* and the Son of God, it enabled Christianity to be presented as a philosophy.”

Thus, “the substantial word of God could be conceived as the Reason which created the world and guided human thought.” This idea of Christianity as a philosophy is denied by many philosophers who think that the category of revelation disqualifies Christianity as a philosophy. But Hadot approaches the question more simply: “If doing philosophy meant living in conformity with reason, then the Christians were philosophers, for they lived in conformity with the divine *Logos.*” What is even more obvious is that “like Greek philosophy, Christian philosophy presented itself both as a discourse and as a way of life.” Christianity, therefore, did not hijack philosophy and distort it; rather it offered its own philosophy of life.

The discourse of Christian philosophy was also formally similar to other views of its time: “The discourse of Christian philosophy was also, quite naturally, exegetic, and the exegetical schools of the Old and the New Testament…offered a kind of teaching which was completely analogous to that of the contemporary philosophical schools.” Also similar to philosophers of the period is that “reading texts is a ‘spiritual’ process closely related to the progress of the soul.”
Even the concept of revelation itself, which is often considered a disqualifier, has roots in ancient philosophy: “Christian philosophy is based on revelation: the Logos is the revelation and manifestation of God.…Yet, with Greek philosophy as well, there existed an entire tradition of systematic theology.” Even the exercises of secular philosophy became evident in the spiritual exercises of Christianity. The parallels between Christian and secular philosophy are simply too numerous to ignore: “The divine law is both the logos of the philosophers and the Christian Logos.”

The monastic movement also has obvious connections to ancient philosophical practices: “The famous monk Antony advised his disciples to practice [examination of conscience] in writing: ‘Let each of us write down the actions and motions of our soul, as if we had to make them known to others.’ This is an invaluable psychological remark: the therapeutic value of examination of the conscience will be greater if it is externalized by means of writing.”

Even the structure of ancient philosophical discourse was taken over by Christian monastics. Evagrius of Pontus says, “Christianity is the doctrine of Christ our Savior; it is composed of praxis, physics, and theology.” In a paragraph that, not only summarizes this topic, but also captures Christianity as a philosophy, Hadot illustrates what makes this book so personally important:

> We must admit, then, that under the influence of ancient philosophy, certain values which had been only secondary (not to say nonexistent) within Christianity rose to the first rank of importance. The gospel idea of the coming of the reign of God was replaced by the philosophical idea of union with God, or deification, achieved by asceticism and contemplation. In some cases, Christian life became less the life of a human being than that of a soul. It became a life according to reason, analogous to that preached by secular philosophers. More specifically, it became a life according to the Spirit, analogous to that of the Platonists; here, the goal was to flee the body in order to turn toward a transcendent, intelligible reality and, if possible, to reach this reality in mystical experience. In any case, attention to the self, the search for impassivity, peace of mind, and the absence of worry, and in particular the flight from the body became the primary objectives of spiritual life. Dorotheus of Gaza declared that peace of mind is so important that we must, if necessary, renounce what we have undertaken in order not to lose it. It is this spirituality, strongly marked by the way of life of ancient philosophical schools, that was inherited by the Christian way of life in the Middle Ages and modern times.

**Eclipses and Recurrences of the Ancient Concept of Philosophy**

What the eclipse of the ancient concept of philosophy means for Hadot is philosophy as discourse without philosophical practice. The cause of this eclipse is attributed to “the flourishing of Christianity.” “Gradually…Christianity, particularly in the Middle Ages, was marked by a divorce between philosophical discourse and a way of life.” How did this happen? Hadot explains: “Philosophy, when placed in the service of theology, was henceforth no more than a theoretical discourse; and…modern philosophy…retained the tendency to limit itself to this point of view.”
What also contributed to this eclipse was the fact that “from the third century A.D. onward Neoplatonism, the synthesis of Aristotelianism and Platonism, was the only philosophical school left. It was this Neoplatonic philosophical discourse that the Church Fathers would use.”¹²⁰ In essence, philosophical concepts were pressed into the service of Christian theology, and the ancient “scholastic exercises of lectio and disputatio merely extended the teaching and exercise methods that were in vogue in the scholastic schools of antiquity.”¹²¹ Hence, the eclipse of ancient philosophy is always, for Hadot, a form of scholastics.

It might be helpful to clarify Hadot’s point by saying that scholastics merely separates theory and practice within the educational context. Put in a positive light, the scholastic tradition actually serves to keep the choice of life personalized; one chooses a way of life from among the many options of scholastic education. This is how this works out in modernity. In the Middle Ages, the Christian way of life was a foregone conclusion at the outset. But at bottom, the scholastic method, whether medieval or modern, presents philosophy “as a purely theoretical activity.”¹²² This leads Hadot to conclude, “University philosophy therefore remains in the same position it occupied in the Middle ages: it is still a servant, sometimes of theology, sometimes of science.”¹²³ The result is all too familiar: “The goal is no longer, as it was in antiquity, to train people for careers as human beings, but to train them for careers as clerks or professors—that is to say, as specialists, theoreticians, and retainers of specific items of more or less esoteric knowledge. Such knowledge, however, no longer involves the whole of life, as ancient philosophy demanded.”

The “conception of philosophy as pure theory” has not eclipsed the ancient view totally.¹²⁴ A number of modern philosophers and philosophical movements continue to stress “the vital, existential dimension of ancient philosophy.” While in modern philosophy after Descartes “evidence has been substituted for askesis,” there are notable exceptions.¹²⁵ Kant, for example, “usually imagines wisdom in the figure of the sage—an ideal norm, never incarnate in a human being, but according to which the philosopher tries to live.”¹²⁶ This “Socratism” of Kant “foreshadows that of Kierkegaard, who said he was a Christian only insofar as he knew he was not Christian.” The irony here is that Kant is often considered to be the Dean of university philosophy professors, and yet, he recognized the eclipse of the ancient ideal: “They [the ancient Greek philosophers] thus remained much more faithful to the idea of the philosopher than has been the case in modern times when we encounter the philosopher only as an artist of reason.”¹²⁷ In fact, it is Kant who distinguishes only two concepts of philosophy: The “scholastic” and the “worldly.”

According to Hadot, this concept of “philosophy of the world” focuses on “the interest of reason” and “is linked to the idea of the primacy of practical reason with regard to theoretical reason.”¹²⁸ This is a concept of philosophy that is “accessible to everyone” because it is built on a fundamental choice of life, not on a domesticated theoretical discipline taught in “the closed, fixed circle of the school.”¹²⁹

Is Hadot indicting Christian philosophy or just those who say, in the words of Etienne Gilson, “The most favorable philosophical position is not that of the philosopher, but that of the Christian”?¹³⁰ It seems clear to me that Christian philosophy per se is not being indicted. As long as theology is not a replacement for or domestication of philosophy, it seems that one can
maintain the ancient ideal while affirming the Christian choice of life. Kierkegaard—I think—is the model here. Also, in the system of Herman Dooyeweerd, theology reflects the pistic modality and is, therefore, part of a Christian philosophy, not a replacement for it. In fact, many Christians have criticized Dooyeweerd for this, accusing him of turning the tables and of making theology a servant of philosophy. Along with Dooyeweerd, I would see Christian theology as being part of a Christian philosophy in the same way that “epoptics” was part of ancient philosophy. Theology (epoptics) is the culmination of the philosophical life and reflects one’s existential choice of life.

Questions and Perspectives

In a last short chapter, Hadot offers some final insights of a summary nature. His first main point is that “from the Middle Ages…to the Christian existentialism of Gabriel Marcel, the philosophical way of life was so long identified with the Christian way of life—so much so, that we can discern traces of Christianity even in the existential attitudes of modern-day philosophers.” This modern-day situation is analogous to the relationship between philosophy and religion in ancient times: “In antiquity, the philosopher encountered religion in his social life…yet he lived religion philosophically, by transforming it into philosophy.” This is essentially what I have attempted in my personal adaptation of the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd; rather than making philosophy the handmaid of theology, I have, as Dooyeweerd has done, made theology a part of a philosophy of temporal experience.

The existential bottom line of Hadot’s approach is reflected in an idea he has developed many ways throughout this important book: “I also believe…that in antiquity it was the philosopher’s choice of a way of life which conditioned his philosophical discourse….I mean that practical reason takes primacy over theoretical reason.” In the words of Plotinus, “it is desire that engenders thought.” This, in my view, is the heart of the entire book. Hadot qualifies this point to avoid voluntarism: “Nevertheless, there is a kind of reciprocal interaction or causality between what the philosopher profoundly wants…and what he tries to elucidate and illuminate by means of reflection. Reflection is inseparable from the will.” This insight reveals Hadot’s existential approach, and yet he has also shown that the evidence of ancient philosophy supports his interpretation. Moreover, this approach is consistent with the Christian idea that the state of the heart is the key to the use of the mind. The starting point of philosophy is ethical, and the choice of life that becomes one’s philosophy of life bears witness to the state of the heart.

What, then, is the single greatest mistake of philosophers in history? Hadot explains: “In the last analysis, it is the scholastic teaching of philosophy, and especially of the history of philosophy, which has always had a tendency to emphasize the theoretical, abstract, and conceptual side of philosophy.” This is really a summary of the main argument of the entire book, an argument the author has made in many contexts. By contrast, ancient philosophers wanted to “form” their audiences, not just “inform” them: “In other words, the goal was to learn a type of know-how; to develop a habitus, or a new capacity to judge and to criticize; and to transform—that is, to change people’s way of living and of seeing the world.”
As a closing quotation illustrating what this book has meant to me, I offer Hadot’s example of the active philosophical life. Georges Friedmann shows how “a contemporary man, engaged in a political struggle…can and should live as a philosopher”:

“To take flight” every day! At least for a moment, which may be brief, so long as it is intense. A “spiritual exercise” every day—alone or in the company of a person who also wants to better himself.

Spiritual exercises. Leave duration behind. Try to strip yourself of your own passions, of the vanities and the rash of noise surrounding your name (which, from time to time, itches like a chronic affliction). Flee backbiting. Strip yourself of pity and of hatred. Love all free human beings. Become eternal by transcending yourself.

This effort upon yourself is necessary; this ambition is just. Many are those who become completely absorbed in militant politics and the preparation of the social revolution. Few, very few, are those who, to prepare for the revolution, are willing to make themselves worthy of it.139

Bibliography


3 Ibid., 3.
4 Ibid., 6.
5 Ibid., 3.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 4.
9 Ibid., 5.
11 Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, xi. In a very important translator’s note, Michael Chase makes a point that explains why no attempt will be made in this paper to cite the ancient authors quoted by Hadot. His own “profound” philological method is based on the belief that “the process of understanding ancient philosophical texts begins when one translates them from the original Greek and Latin. Hadot’s understanding of ancient philosophy has thus been shaped by his own interpretation and translation of ancient texts, so that to replace his translations by those from some ‘standard’ English version would render his thought incomprehensible.” Therefore, it is my
purpose throughout this exposition to preserve these interpretive translations as Hadot’s personal appropriation of his ancient sources (cf. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 49-70).

13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 11.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid., 13.
17 Ibid., 14.
18 Ibid., 16.
19 Ibid., 17.
20 Ibid., 18.
21 Ibid., 17.
22 Ibid., 19.
23 Ibid., 20.
24 Ibid., 19.
25 Ibid., 39; Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 147-178.
26 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 33.
27 Ibid., 34.
28 Ibid., 35.
29 Ibid., 36.
30 Ibid., 37.
31 Ibid., 27.
32 Ibid., 28.
33 Ibid., 30.
34 Ibid., 37.
35 Ibid., 38.
36 Ibid., 41.
37 Ibid., 42.
38 Ibid., 43.
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40 Ibid., 44.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 46.
43 Ibid., 47.
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46 Ibid., 56.
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48 Ibid., 62.
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77 Ibid., 128-129.
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81 Ibid., 145.
82 Ibid., 102.
83 Ibid., 103.
84 Ibid., 115.
85 Ibid., 117.
86 Ibid., 141.
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89 Ibid., 148-149.
90 Ibid., 149.
91 Ibid., 150-151.
92 Ibid., 151.
93 Ibid., 152.
94 Ibid., 153.
95 Ibid., 156.
96 Ibid., 173.
97 Ibid., 174.
98 Ibid., 176.
100 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, 177.
101 Ibid., 187.
102 Ibid., 189-190.
103 Ibid., 197.
104 Ibid., 198; cf. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 217-237.
105 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 204.
106 Ibid., 205.
107 Ibid., 196.
108 Ibid., 238.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid., 239; cf. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 126-144.
111 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 239.
112 Ibid., 240.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid., 241.
115 Ibid., 243.
116 Ibid., 249.
117 Ibid., 252.
118 Ibid., 253.
119 Ibid., 254.
120 Ibid., 256.
121 Ibid., 258.
122 Ibid., 259.
123 Ibid., 260.
124 Ibid., 261.
125 Ibid., 264.
126 Ibid., 266.
127 Ibid., 267.
128 Ibid., 268-269.
129 Ibid., 268.
130 Ibid., 259.
133 Ibid., 272.
134 Ibid., 271.
135 See note 131 above.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 274.